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Organizational Capability in the Public Sector:  
A Configurational Approach 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper brings together resource-based theory and contingency theory to analyse 
organizational capability in the public sector.  Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis is 
used to identify configurations of organizational attributes (department size, structural 
complexity, agencification, personnel instability, use of temporary employees), associated 
with high and low organizational capability in UK central government departments.  Findings 
identify a single core configuration of organizational attributes associated with high 
capability departments - low structural complexity and personnel stability.  Two core 
configurations are associated with low capability departments – personnel instability, and the 
combination of structural complexity and departmental agencification.  Based on the 
configurations evident in successful and struggling organizations, discussion illuminates 
potential organizational design strategies to improve public sector organizational capability.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For the last twenty years, the political salience of public sector performance has made the 
capability of public organizations to deliver increasingly cost-effective and responsive 
services one of the key issues vexing policy-makers and analysts alike (Walker, Boyne, and 
Brewer 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2008).  Yet despite the explosion of interest in public service improvement 
(Ashworth, Entwistle, and Boyne 2010), evidence on the management and performance of 
public organizations still lags behind that for private firms and is largely restricted to a 
comparatively small number of organizational settings (O’Toole and Meier 2015).  One 
symptom of this evidence gap is an apparent reluctance in the field of public administration 
to draw upon the full range of contemporary theories of organizing.  In particular, we note 
that resource-based theory - one of the “most prominent and powerful theories for 
understanding organizations” (Barney, Ketchen, and Wright 2011, 1299) - offers much 
potential for understanding the management and performance of public services (Matthews 
and Schulman 2005).  Despite this, its influence has only recently been felt in public 
administration research (see Bryson, Ackermann, and Eden 2007; Harvey et al. 2010; Piening 
2013).  
Organizational capability is a concept that has been used to encapsulate the insights of 
the resource-based theory of the firm about the organizational sources of high performance 
(Collis, 1994).  The effective management of any organization requires the coordination of an 
array of internal organizational processes, routines and activities.  The organizational 
capability concept is increasingly deployed in the strategic management literature as a means 
of capturing how this coordination may be theorised, studied and understood (see Strategic 
Management Journal, 24(10), 2003; also Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007).  Organizational 
capability is essentially constituted by the high-level organizational practices used to 
 4 
coordinate the productive activities of the firm (Winter 2003).  These practices represent a 
distinctive set of ‘problem-solving patterns’ or competencies that organizations can rely upon 
when pursuing key goals (Feldman and Pentland 2003).  As such, the patterns of problem-
solving enacted by organizational leaders and members evolve from their accumulated 
experiences, and are inevitably shaped by the internal organizational structures, processes and 
conditions that create opportunities for distinctive competencies to develop (Ulrich and Lake 
1991). Where internal organizational attributes are conducive to the strengthening of 
distinctive competencies, then the capability of the organization is likely to be enhanced, at 
least in the short-term (March 1991).  All of which suggests that organizational design could 
play a key role in determining the emergence of high or low capability. 
Contingency theories of organization design, in particular, indicate that structural 
attributes such as organizational size, structural complexity and personnel stability can all 
influence the behaviour and decision-making ability of employees (Donaldson 2001), and 
may, in turn, influence the degree of capability present within an organization.  At the same 
time, each of these represent organizational attributes within the purview of senior 
management, which can be adjusted or adapted according to identified needs and goals.  This 
relationship between capability and organizational attributes is likely to be especially 
important in the professional bureaucracies typically found in the public sector, which may be 
less open to market forces and have less room for strategic maneuver than their private sector 
counterparts (Harvey et al. 2010). Politicians and policy-makers’ responses to perceived 
weaknesses in the capability of public organizations invariably involve attempts to restructure 
those organizations. So, for instance, central government departments and agencies may be 
merged or disaggregated depending on whether their size is perceived to be a help or a 
hindrance to the work that they do (see Talbot and Johnson 2007).  
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For large public organizations, capability might be anticipated to expand or shrink in 
line with an increase in staffing (Jung 2013).  Structural complexity increases the diversity of 
activities that must be coordinated (Mintzberg 1993), as does the trend towards the structural 
devolution of key activities to semi-autonomous sub-units (agencification) that has been 
observed in the public sector in many countries (James and van Thiel, 2010).  Both of these 
may cultivate or challenge capability development.  Similarly, employee turnover may 
weaken existing competencies and lead to goal displacement as organizations lose firm-
specific skills (Lepak and Snell 1999), though it is also possible that a certain amount of 
turnover brings with it new ideas and innovations.  Are large public organizations more 
capable than small?  Do structural complexity, agencification and personnel instability 
weaken or strengthen public organizational capability?  What combinations of these attributes 
result in high and low public organizational capability?   
This paper seeks to answer these questions by bringing together resource-based theory 
and contingency theory to explore ‘What configurations of organizational attributes are 
associated with high and low organizational capability in UK central government 
departments?’  To answer this research question, we adopt a set-theoretic analytic approach, 
namely fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA - Ragin 2000).  One of the major 
strengths of fsQCA is that it can derive configurational combinations of organizational 
attributes associated with an outcome, from a relatively limited number of units of analysis.  
The comparatively small number of UK central government departments, combining a range 
of organizational attributes, is therefore an apposite setting for its application.  In addition, in 
fsQCA ‘causal asymmetry is assumed, meaning that the presence and the absence of the 
outcome, respectively, may require different explanations’ (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 9).  
This means that we are potentially able to identify more than one configuration of 
organizational attributes associated with high capability, and more than one configuration 
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associated with low capability.  By capturing the potential for different combinations of 
attributes to result in the same outcome, researchers using fsQCA are able to produce 
findings that can aid decision-makers responsible for organizational design.  
In the following parts of the paper, we introduce the theory of organizational 
capability and consider extant research regarding its determinants, focusing in particular on 
contingency theory as a source for our theoretical expectations about the likely structural 
influences on capability.  Thereafter, the organizational attributes used in our model of 
organizational capability are described and the data coding and processing for the fsQCA 
explained.  Finally, we discuss the results of our analysis and conclude by reflecting on their 
practical implications, as well as the relevance of both resource-based and contingency 
theories for public administration research.  
 
THEORY AND RESEARCH ON ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY  
The resource-based theory of the firm suggests that human resources constitute precious and 
unique assets that are central to the success of an organization (Barney 1991).  In particular, 
an organization’s knowledge, skills-base and inter-personal networks are both rare and very 
difficult to imitate, and so offer a critical source for sustainable competitive advantage 
(Barney 1991; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007).  The 
practices through which an organization brings its human resources into play in pursuit of its 
goals thus constitute distinctive competencies, and as such, represent the capacity or 
capability of an organization to succeed in its endeavours (Helfat and Peteraf 2003).  Taken 
in combination, the quality of leadership and management within an organization, the 
effectiveness of its strategic and operational management practices and the links between 
each of these attributes and the productive activities of the firm, all constitute the capability 
of an organization to achieve desired outcomes.   
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 Although resource-based theory was developed with firms competing in the free 
market in mind, the core ideas also have great relevance to public sector organizations 
(Bryson, Ackermann, and Eden 2007; Piening 2013).  In particular, resource-based theory 
speaks to the idea that public organizations are largely dependent on the human resources that 
they are able to marshal in pursuit of better performance.  Public organizations are, by and 
large, non-market institutions, and so not suited to other influential theories of organizing for 
performance, such as Michael Porter’s (1980) competitive strategy typology which speaks to 
market orientation and cost-differentiation.  The idea that human resources are key to 
capability is especially important in central government departments, which are responsible 
for formulating public policy and overseeing its implementation. 
To the extent that public organizations are able to skilfully deploy their human 
resources, they are likely to evince the kind of capability required to achieve their often 
complex array of goals (Rainey 2009).  Moreover, in the current era of performance-based 
reforms of the public sector (Radin 2006), the pursuit of capability is often not only a matter 
of individual managerial responsibility or political necessity.  Performance classification 
schemes, such as school league tables and hospital star ratings, have been implemented to 
drive improvements by encouraging ‘yardstick competition’ between different organizations 
(c.f. Revelli and Tovmo 2007) and/or processes of knowledge transfer and diffusion 
throughout organizational populations more generally (Ashworth, Boyne, and Delbridge 
2009).  
Whatever the origins of the pursuit of organizational capability in the public sector, 
very little is actually known about what organizational attributes, or combinations of 
attributes, enable or restrict the emergence of high or low capability.  While several studies 
utilising a resource-based theory approach have now explored the effects of capability on 
organizational outcomes in the public sector (see Piening 2013 for a review of these), to date, 
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public management research has not focused on the ways in which capability is shaped by 
internal organizational contingencies.  In fact, this lacuna in the literature on capability is also 
apparent within the prior work in private organizations (see Pablo et al. 2007), despite the 
determinants and enablers of organizational capability being regarded as a key topic within 
the literature on resource-based theory (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).  Of studies that have 
considered relevant organizational attributes, strategic management research has emphasized 
the centrality of knowledge management and integration to the concept of capability (e.g. 
Grant 1996; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  Some further studies point towards the salience of 
market rather than organizational attributes (e.g. Helfat and Lieberman 2002).  Others are 
concerned with the relationship between managerial behaviours and market-based 
competences (Daneels 2008).   
As capability is embedded in context (Piening 2013), sectoral differences mean that 
the findings evident in extant market-oriented empirical analyses are not easily transferable to 
the public sector, particularly within central government departments that are typically more 
insulated from market forces than most public service organizations.  Nevertheless, it is 
possible to draw on other sources of inspiration within the organizational studies literature to 
develop theoretical expectations relevant to the context of this study.  Contingency theory, in 
particular, offers a cogent perspective on the structural organizational attributes that might be 
expected to influence organizational capability in the public sector. 
 
Organizational determinants of capability in public organizations 
Although contingency theory is generally associated with organizational studies, it has a long 
and venerable history of application in public administration research (see for example 
Greenwood, Hinings and Ranson 1975; Greenwood and Hinings 1977). Contingency theory 
suggests that organizational outcomes are largely shaped by organizations’ external and 
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internal contexts.  Organizational capability is concerned with internal context, and how this 
is marshalled.  Alternative perspectives on the role of internal context within contingency 
theory “may be integrated by stating that there are two main contingencies, task and size” 
Donaldson (2001, 16).  These two key internal structural contingencies are likely to be 
critical enablers of (or barriers to) the development of capability, since they underpin an 
organization’s ability and opportunity to adapt to its external environment (Pablo et al. 2007).  
To investigate the potential structural determinants of organizational capability in the public 
sector, we therefore focus on the kinds of variables that have been used in prior public 
administration research that applies contingency theory (see, for example, Andrews and 
Boyne 2014; Jung and Kim 2014). Specifically, we investigate the role of organizational size, 
as well as other key task-related structural attributes (structural complexity, agencification, 
personnel instability, and the use of temporary employees). In doing so, we are interested in 
the configurations of those attributes that are associated with high or low organizational 
capability.  
 Configurational approaches to the application of contingency theory suggest that the 
direction of influence of any given organizational attribute on an organizational outcome 
depends on the presence or absence of other attributes. This is not only something with 
relevance for private firms (see Doty, Glick and Huber 1996), but has been shown to matter 
in empirical public administration research (see, for example, Walker 2008). For these 
reasons we theorise bi-directional relationships between each structural attribute and 
organizational capability. Clearly, there may be other influences on the development of 
organizational capability than those we focus on here, not least managerial ones, such as the 
personality of departmental leaders, as well as policy-related ones, such as policy saliency 
and mission. However, in focusing on structural attributes we have sought to develop a 
parsimonious model of capability that is guided by contingency theory, focused on contextual 
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attributes under the purview of senior management, and that can be replicated in other 
settings with some degree of ease. Next we consider the potential influence of each of the 
five organizational attributes considered (size, structural complexity, agencification, 
personnel instability and the use of temporary employees). 
Organizational size has long been one of the most salient attributes in the study of 
organizational behaviour, especially in terms of its relationship with organizational structures 
and processes (see Hall, Johnson, and Haas 1967; Kimberly 1976).  Within the organization 
studies literature, arguments about size have typically taken one of two forms.  First, the 
“complexity-administrative growth hypothesis” (Rushing 1967) suggests that increased size 
brings with it inflated complexity in the coordination of an organization’s activities, as well 
as the proliferation of communication problems.  Second, the ‘internal economies of scale 
perspective’ (Blau 1972), indicates that being bigger can enable an organization to spread its 
administrative costs across a larger number of individuals, and, therefore, to reinvest the 
savings in improvements to organizational functioning.  Thus, in theory, size may have either 
a positive or a negative relationship with capability in public organizations – or no 
relationship as the costs and benefits of increasing scale cancel each other out. 
The number of occupational specialties and production sub-units within an 
organization are widely thought to be an indicator of the complexity of the task coordination 
it faces (Hall, Johnson, and Haas 1967).  The relative degree of “structural complexity” found 
within an organization may result in a demand for greater administrative control over the 
activities of employees.  In turn, this could disrupt the smooth functioning of organizations 
that often depend upon tacit knowledge and relationships of trust (Murnane and Nelson 
1984).  However, it is conceivable that a variegated management structure holds the key to 
more comprehensive implementation of strategic and operational decisions (Thomas and 
Dunkerley 1999), especially in central government departments, which are charged with the 
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administration of a diverse array of public policies.  Hence, while structural complexity may 
potentially pose problems for effective functioning, it is also possible that a more 
differentiated management structure can enable public organizations to carry out a range of 
specialized tasks more efficiently (Andrews 2010).  Thus, structural complexity may be 
positively or negatively related to organizational capability in the public sector.  
Related to the issue of structural complexity in public organizations, is the extent to 
which those organizations’ functions have been disaggregated into semi-autonomous sub-
units. Structural disaggregation (or agencification) is associated with New Public 
Management and attempts to cut costs by breaking-up large bureaucracies and thereby free 
managers from political control (James and van Thiel 2010).  The establishment of 
“executive agencies” as sub-units within large government ministries was pioneered in the 
UK government, and the management and performance of those agencies continues to be an 
issue of great academic and political interest (see, for example, Pina, Arcas, and Caridad 
2012; and http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/mar/26/uk-border-agency-broken-up).  In 
theory, agencification is supposed to improve organizational capability by giving managers 
more freedom to manage.  However, in practice, it may have resulted in the “hollowing out” 
of management capacity within government departments (Talbot 2004), which indicates that 
there could be a positive or a negative relationship between the relative agencification of a 
public organization and overall capability.   
Within the general management literature, personnel instability is thought to impede 
the growth, or lead to the loss of, firm-specific employee knowledge (Lepak and Snell 1999).  
A stable core workforce can enhance development of the unique and valuable resources of an 
organization, whereas the selection, induction and training of new recruits requires a 
substantial investment of time and money (Griffith and Horn 2001; Ashforth, Sluss, and Saks 
2007).  Such investment may, in turn, weaken the overall capability of an organization to 
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respond effectively to key delivery challenges.  Employees need to be retained at sufficient 
rates to ensure that the benefits of their skills and development are captured (McDermott et 
al. 2013).  These issues may be especially important in the public sector, as effective 
organizational functioning is largely dependent upon the talent, training, motivation, and 
effort of myriad professional groups (Nigro, Nigro, and Kellough 2006).  This is particularly 
so for central government departments, which are primarily concerned with the provision of 
high-level policy advice and guidance on a multitude of different issues.  Even so, a series of 
benefits may still be realized from employee turnover, such as payroll reductions (Dalton and 
Todor 1982), removal of poor performers, and the injection of new ideas (Abelson and 
Baysinger 1984).  As a result, the relationship between personnel instability and 
organizational capability may be positive or negative depending on the particular 
requirements of a given organization.   
Finally, the proportion of temporary workers within an organization may affect the 
development of capability.  Employees on temporary contracts are often thought to 
experience lower commitment to their employers than their permanent counterparts, because 
they have a transactional psychological contract, which binds them to an organization for 
primarily economic reasons (Milward and Hopkins 1998).  Organizational commitment is 
correlated with extra- and in-role performance (Riketta 2002) and is widely regarded as a 
source of better organizational performance in the public sector (Kim 2005).  Nevertheless, it 
is also possible that due to ‘anticipatory socialisation’ temporary employees sometimes 
exhibit higher organizational commitment than their permanent counterparts (McDonald and 
Makin 2000).  Thus, it is conceivable that high levels of temporary employment could make 
it either harder or easier for government departments to manage employees effectively, and 
thereby influence overall capability for better or worse.  
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Following Mintzberg (1993), we note that organizational attributes do not occur in 
isolation.  Rather, they tend to coalesce around configurations, which shape organizational 
outcomes, and which can be as numerous and diverse as there are cases.  However, given the 
competing theoretical expectations for each considered condition – and QCA’s focus on the 
interplay between conditions – we do not specify in advance which configurations of 
attributes will be most strongly associated with high or low capability.  As Schneider and 
Wageman (2010, 410) note, ‘QCA is rarely ever applied with the main purpose of testing 
ready-made hypotheses distilled from the literature’.  They identify six possible aims of 
QCA, including creating empirical typologies and developing new theoretical arguments. 
Given the nascent nature of work on organizational capability in the public sector it is these 
we pursue: adopting an inductive approach to identify empirical typologies and using these to 
develop new theoretical arguments.  Thus, like Greckhamer (2011), we use fsQCA to identify 
configurational relationships between our selected organizational attributes (size, complexity, 
agencification, personnel instability and use of temporary employees) and high and low 
capability, to answer our core research question: What configurations of organizational 
attributes are associated with high and low organizational capability in UK central 
government departments? 
 
METHOD AND DATA 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is an analytic approach to social science grounded 
in set theory (Ragin 1987).  Considerations of set relations in social research involve the 
identification and explication of causal connections linking a set of social phenomena, in 
ways that are asymmetric (c.f. Ragin 2008b).  Initially developed for small-sample research 
(Ragin 2000), QCA is now applied across a range of population sizes, and enables cross-case 
analysis of a larger number of cases than would otherwise be manageable (Young and Park 
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2013).  It is an especially powerful approach to social science research because, unlike 
conventional statistical analyses, QCA does not identify the independent effect of a variable 
on the likelihood of an outcome. Instead, it is premised on identifying causal combinations - 
configurations of key attributes associated with an outcome of interest (Fiss, Cambre, and 
Marx 2013).  Public policy researchers have long been interested in the use of QCA, 
especially for comparisons of outcomes in different countries (see Rihoux et al. 2013 for a 
review).  Consistent with recent calls for public administration to draw upon this method 
more (Rizova, 2011), researchers are now applying QCA to the study of public organizations 
(see, for example, Kitchener, Beynon, and Harrington 2002; Maggetti 2007; Vis 2009; 2011; 
Young and Park 2013).   
QCA takes a number of forms: Crisp-set QCA is premised on the analysis of variables 
with only two potential values (e.g. the presence/absence of a condition).  Multi-value QCA 
is premised on multi-value conditions (e.g. poor, average or good performance).  By contrast, 
fsQCA can be used to determine, in a nuanced way, the degree to which attributes are present 
or absent (Ragin 2008a).   This is achieved by coding data points on an interval scale (from 0 
to 1) to identify their degree of membership to sets of independent and dependent attributes 
(see Ragin 2000).   
In this study, fsQCA is used to identify configurations of organizational attributes that 
contribute towards high and low capability in UK central government departments.  To 
achieve this, fsQCA treats each possible configuration of organizational attributes as a single 
case. Through comparison, it identifies the causal conditions (e.g. our organizational 
attributes - size etc.) associated with each outcome (e.g. high or low capability)1, including 
the minimal causal conditions necessary or sufficient for the outcome to occur. Causal 
conditions are necessary when the outcome cannot occur without them.  Causal conditions 
                                                 
1
 ‘Causal’ is used within the QCA literature as a technical term denoting the presence of an association between 
a condition and an outcome.  
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are sufficient when the outcome always occurs when the condition is present, although the 
outcome could also result from other conditions (Rihoux and Ragin 2009).  The analysis 
presented here further considers whether the conditions responsible for high organizational 
capability are the same as, or different from, those causing low organizational capability - 
known as “causal asymmetry”. Thus, fsQCA facilitates the consideration of divergent 
outcomes as well as alternative paths to those outcomes. 
In methodological terms, the UK central government is an excellent context for the 
application of fsQCA, due to the comparatively small number of large departments.  In 2007, 
UK central government had twenty-one major spending departments (see HM Treasury 
2007).  These departments are responsible for macro level policy formulation and 
implementation.  Departments vary greatly in size and budget, depending on their functions 
and responsibilities.  Those responsible for large policy fields, such as the Home Office, 
which deals with immigration, security and law and order, are often composed of multiple 
smaller functional units and executive agencies.  In theoretical and empirical terms, the UK 
central government is a novel context in which to use fsQCA, and one that has been under-
studied in recent times.  In utilising fsQCA in this context we are therefore able to address an 
important gap in the current scholarly literature on the management of public organizations, 
whilst also illustrating the value of this nascent approach.  Next we detail the outcome and 
condition attributes considered in our analyses.  
 
Organizational capability 
The management and performance of public sector organizations is complex, 
multidimensional and inherently political (Rainey 1993).  Their achievements are judged by a 
diverse array of constituencies, such as taxpayers, employees, policy-makers and politicians, 
each of whom may have very different views on what constitutes a desirable outcome.  The 
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criteria, weighting, and interpretation of all measures of organizational outcomes are thus 
subject to ongoing debate and contestation amongst key stakeholder groups (Boyne 2003).  
The analysis presented here focuses on information published as part of the UK civil service 
capability review programme, which began in 2007.  This programme was established by the 
Head of the Civil Service at the time (Sir Gus O’Donnell), to assess the capability of central 
government departments and to identify areas requiring additional support and development 
to function as effectively as possible (Sunningdale Institute 2007).  
The development of a scheme for grading the capability of central government 
departments was a piece of the wider public service reform agenda of the Labour government 
of the time, which sought to use an array of performance management techniques to 
“modernise” the UK public sector (Lapsley, 2009). An important feature of this agenda was a 
commitment to ‘better regulation’ (Radaelli and De Francesco 2007) focused on generating 
reflexive institutions, premised on meta-regulation, transparent processes, replicability of 
analysis, peer review and accountability (ibid) and informed by data and indicators in line 
with the rise of evidence-based policy-making (c.f. Sanderson 2006). Critics have argued that 
these developments reflected a wider trend towards an ‘audit society’ through which 
governments sought to exert greater managerial control over the work of public sector 
professionals (Power 1997). Nevertheless, although the data from the capability reviews can 
be seen as part of an on-going government project to gain control over the bureaucracy, the 
evolution of the programme also reflects an acknowledgement that the civil service should be 
more accountable for the critical role it plays in the wider production of public governance 
(Bovaird and Russell 2007). The reviews provide potential for reflexive monitoring and 
learning, premised on a shift from purely technical towards practical rationality, with 
experiential knowledge informing peer assessments (c.f. Sanderson, 2006). From this 
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perspective, the capability reviews offer a valuable insight into the management of a set of 
public service organizations that are often only viewed through a glass darkly.  
 The departments responsible for devolved government in Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales did not undertake full capability reviews, and so are excluded from our analysis.  
The remaining eighteen departments that are included in the analysis are shown in Table 1 
below.  The 2007 capability reviews were peer-based assessments of each department.  Each 
review team was led by the principal secretary of another department with the support of 
external advisors from other parts of the public sector, industry and academia. Although these 
assessments were not ‘blinded’, they were reached through an agreed process and evaluation 
framework that was applied by ‘experts’ and that resulted in the production of publicly 
available reports detailing the process and outcomes of the peer review. They are, therefore, 
in many ways preferable to the kinds of self-reported measures of internal organizational 
practices that are often used in empirical research and that may suffer from several different 
kinds of respondent bias (see Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski 2000). Of course, 
notwithstanding the strengths of peer review, internal reputation and other forms of 
subjective bias may still have influenced the senior civil servants responsible for conducting 
capability reviews. Even so, an external evaluation of the capability review programme 
suggested that the conclusions of the peer review teams generally aligned with those of 
departments themselves (National Audit Office 2009). Thus, while we are, like other 
organizational researchers, constrained to rely on some form of subjective assessment of the 
quality of the leadership and management in organizations (see Bloom and van Reenen 
2006), we do have some confidence that the capability review data captures something 
important about the management of the civil service. 
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For the purposes of the capability reviews, each department was rated on a scale of 1 
(serious concerns about current capability) to 5 (strong capability for future delivery) on ten 
dimensions of capability under three main headings:   
 Leadership (set direction – a compelling vision for the organization, follow-through on 
tough decisions, common ownership of the vision amongst key stakeholders and constant 
updates; ignite passion, pace and drive – inspires stakeholder confidence, encourages and 
acts on feedback, challenges the organization to improve, creates a culture of 
organizational pride; take responsibility for leading delivery and change – senior leaders 
model an appropriate corporate team-working culture, demonstrate personal commitment, 
boundary-spanning and effective change management; build capability – talent 
management, workforce development, employee performance management, staff are 
representative of the population)  
 Strategy (focus on outcomes – challenging targets and clear indicators of success, with 
emphasis on improving citizens’ quality of life, effective management of trade-offs 
between priorities and ministerial relationships; base choices on evidence – customer 
responsiveness, future planning and options appraisal, evidence-based decisions, support 
for innovation; build common purpose – engages partners in the delivery chain, removes 
obstacles to joint-working, effective collaboration with partners); 
 Delivery (plan, resource and prioritise – sequencing of priorities, delivery plans aligned 
with overall strategy, control of resources, planning reviews; develop clear roles, 
responsibilities and delivery models – clear purpose for functions, strong accountability, 
transparent delivery models, capability development throughout the delivery chain; 
manage performance – leaders responsible for driving excellence, high-quality 
performance information, risk management, financial data used for efficiency gains) 
(Sunningdale Institute 2007).  
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The capability reviews capture aspects of organizational capability that are distinctive 
to public organizations, such as citizen focus, quality of life, accountability, transparency and 
ministerial relationships, as well as other generic management aspects, such as effective 
change management, customer responsiveness and control of resources. In this respect, our 
use of the capability reviews offers a valuable example of how resource-based theory can be 
applied and extended within a distinctive public sector setting to illustrate the multi-faceted 
nature of public management. 
To capture the multidimensionality of the goals and outcomes of central government 
departments in a single measure, we construct an index of the overall capability of each 
department by adding the scores from 1 to 5 for each of the ten separate dimensions of 
capability.  We divide the sum of the scores for each capability dimension by the maximum 
possible score (i.e. 50).  This aggregate measure of capability is equivalent to other indices of 
organizational outcomes used in public administration research, such as the Program 
Assessment Rating Tool (PART) for US federal government, the Government Performance 
Project (GPP) grades for US state governments, and the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessments (CPAs) for English local governments.  Due to the continuous nature of the 
scores for the measure of capability, they are especially suitable for use in fsQCA. As 
previously detailed, fsQCA is premised on continuous measures.  We are also fortunate in 
being able to draw upon a comprehensive set of secondary quantitative data on the civil 
service workforce, published by the Office of National Statistics (2007).  This was used to 
construct multi-value attributes gauging the causal conditions associated with organizational 
capability, as detailed next.   
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Organizational attributes 
Department size (Size) - is measured as the total head count within each government 
department.  This figure is calculated by summing the number of full and part time staff in 
each sub-unit within each spending department.  Large organizations are sometimes thought 
to be especially difficult to coordinate, due to the sheer number of social relationships within 
them (Caplow 1957; Chapin 1951).  All the same, conventional economic arguments on scale 
effects suggest that large public organizations can spread fixed central costs (e.g. senior 
management team, information technology, premises), thereby permitting the release of more 
resources for organizational development (Davies 1969).  We therefore anticipate that large 
departments could have high or low capability, and that the influence of size may most likely 
be felt in combination with other organizational attributes. 
 
Structural complexity (Complex) - is measured by constructing a Hehrfindahl index of the 
distribution of employees within the hierarchical levels of each department.  The proportion 
of civil servants within each level of the organizational hierarchy (e.g. senior executive 
officers, executive officers) was squared and the sum of these squares subtracted from 
10,000.  By subtracting the sum of squared proportions from 10,000, it means that we derive 
a number for which a high score equals a high level of complexity within the department. 
This is the standard calculation economists undertake to create a measure of fractionalization 
within markets and has also been used extensively to derive measures of population diversity 
(see Trawick and Howsen 2006).  Coordination problems could multiply faster in 
organizations that are structurally complex, because “the division of labour becomes more 
differentiated and specialized” (Kahn et al. 1964, 75) or they could potentially be better 
resolved through the same process.  Thus, structurally complex departments may have low or 
high capability. 
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Agencification (Agency) - During the past twenty years, government departments in the UK 
have been subject to a process of disaggregation, whereby many of their key functions have 
been hived off to semi-autonomous agencies.  While these agencies are formally responsible 
to their home departments, they enjoy considerable discretion over the management of their 
human resources in particular (Dillman 2007).  The degree of agencification in each central 
government department was gauged by calculating the proportion of civil servants in each 
department who were employed by executive agencies.  Previous research has suggested that 
agencification may have led to improvements in service delivery, but been detrimental for the 
development of management capacity within parent departments (Talbot 2004).  We 
therefore anticipate that high capability departments could have high or low levels of 
agencification – and vice versa. 
 
Personnel instability (Instability) - is measured by creating a ratio of new entrants to leavers 
in each department.  This measure taps the extent to which existing staffing arrangements are 
being disrupted by the arrival of new employees, and therefore the extent to which 
departments must divert resources away from core competencies towards secondary ones 
associated with employee recruitment, selection and induction procedures.  Such procedures 
are integral to the management of human resources, but do not necessarily constitute the most 
distinctive competences of an organization (Dillman 2007).  At the same time, the measure 
also captures the potential for the input of positive ideas and practices from new recruits, 
which might enhance organizational functioning.  As such, we expect that high capability 
departments could have low or high levels of personnel instability – and vice versa. 
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Temporary employees (Temps) - Government use of temporary employees has become more 
frequent in the wake of New Public Management reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  The 
proportion of the staff employed on temporary contracts in each UK central government 
department (including those in executive agencies) is therefore measured to capture this 
broad shift towards public sector job insecurity.  Temporary employees are sometimes, 
though not always, found to be less committed to their organization and less inclined to 
engage in organizational citizenship behaviours than their permanent counterparts (Coyle-
Shapiro and Kessler 2002).  Thus this measure could be seen as a proxy for the proportion of 
employees adhering to a transactional psychological contract, rather than the relational one 
thought to underpin the organizational commitment of British civil servants (Horton 2012).  
Nevertheless, when managed effectively temporary employees may constitute a valuable 
source of additional capacity, so high capability departments may have fewer or more 
temporary employees – and vice versa. 
 
Data coding and analysis for the fsQCA 
The considered condition and outcome attributes differ in their underlying forms (e.g. 
interval, ratio and ordinal data – see Table A1 for their original attribute values).  They were 
recoded for inclusion in the fsQCA on a 0 to 1 continuous scale (Ragin 2008a; Woodside, 
Hsu, and Marshall 2011), to construct a ‘continuous’ fuzzy set for each attribute.  This 
involved applying the ‘direct method’ approach to coding (see Ragin 2008a).  The direct 
method identifies three qualitative anchors for each attribute, which enable the evaluation of 
the degree of membership of individual data points. In effect, the degree of membership 
identifies the extent to which each central government department displays an attribute, e.g. 
Complexity.   The anchors are: (1) the threshold for full non-membership (i.e. definitely not a 
complex department); (2) the threshold for full membership (i.e. definitely a complex 
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department) and; (3) the cross-over point, where there is maximum ambiguity about 
membership (i.e. ambiguity regarding whether a department is more complex than not).  
Following Rihoux and De Meur (2009), we note that the qualitative anchors were selected on 
the basis of technical and qualitative assessment.  Specifically the distribution and 
meaningfulness of potential mechanical qualitative anchors (e.g. percentiles of established 
probability density function form of distribution of the cases over each attribute) were 
qualitatively evaluated, as detailed below (see Figure A1 in Appendix A for a graphical 
elucidation of the approach).   
 First, the evaluation of the qualitative anchors was technically informed by the 
identification of the 5th percentile (for full non-membership), 95th percentile (for full-
membership) and 50th percentile (cross-over point) values, based on a constructed probability 
density function (pdf) graph for each considered condition and outcome.  Following 
Greckhamer (2011), the ‘lowest’, ‘highest’ and ‘surrounding 50th percentile’ pairs of cases 
were identified, and considered against the anchors in terms of the threshold for full-non-
membership; the threshold for full-membership and; (3) the cross-over point, respectively.  
Second, each initial pair of departments, those near to them, and groups either side of 
the cross-over point were qualitatively assessed, drawing on the authors’ theoretical expertise 
and qualitative knowledge of central government departments.  As illustrated in Figure A1, 
for the case of the Size attribute, a natural grouping of four departments of similar size – 
Energy and Climate Change; Culture, Media and Sport; International Development and 
Innovation, Universities and Skills – were closely grouped below the 5th percentile. The 
cross-over point based on the 50th percentile noticeably separated two departments – the 
Home Office and Defence, with qualitative assessment suggesting that differences in their 
size made this an appropriate cross-over point.  Further illustrating our qualitative 
assessment, the median case was here ruled out as theoretically and qualitatively unjustifiable 
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as a cross-over point.  Last, for the 95th percentile, its position between the two largest 
departments – Chancellor’s Departments and Work and Pensions was qualitatively 
justifiable, with clear differences in sheer scale.  This calibration approach and associated 
qualitative assessment was subsequently adopted for each condition and outcome attribute.  
The 5th, 50th and 95th percentile were consistently adopted for the three qualitative anchors.  
Graphs showing the impact of the three qualitative anchors for the considered condition and 
outcome attributes are provided in Figure A2 in the Appendix (with qualitative anchor values 
also shown). 
Table 1 presents an overview of the resulting membership scores for all of the 
conditions (Size, Complex, Agency, Temps and Instability) and the outcome ‘Capability’, for 
the eighteen central government departments considered.  The scores presented in Table 1 
illustrate that, according to the Capability Reviews carried out in 2007, the most capable 
government department was International Development, while the least capable was the 
Home Office.  The largest department at that time was Work and Pensions, the most 
structurally complex Culture, Media and Sport, the most “agencified” the Ministry of Justice, 
the department with the most temporary staff the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 
with the Home Office having the highest degree of personnel instability.  The smallest 
department with the fewest temporary staff was Energy and Climate Change, the least 
complex department was the Ministry of Justice, the least agencified the Departments of 
Children, School and Families, Energy and Climate Change and International Development, 
with the Chancellor’s department having the greatest personnel stability. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
The intention of the employment of fsQCA is the identification of causal 
configurations of conditions associated with an outcome.  These configurations are elucidated 
through truth tables, wherein binary notation is used to denote the presence (1) or absence (0) 
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of the condition and outcome attributes.  Truth tables are the key tool of set-theoretic analysis 
(Ragin 1987; Ragin, Strand, and Rubinson 2008), describing cases’ diversity.  However, this 
is often ‘limited diversity’ where not all logically possible configurations are represented in 
empirical reality, due to ‘causal conditions’ tendency to fall into coherent patterns’ (Meyer, 
Tsui, and Hinings 1993, 1176).  Tables 2 and 3 are truth tables showing the empirically 
present combinations associated with the outcomes High-capability (Table 2) and Low-
capability (Table 3).2  Following Greckhamer (2011), we emphasise that set-theoretic 
analysis does not presume linearity. Considering both outcomes separately illustrates the 
potential for elucidating causal asymmetry with fsQCA.  
 [Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
There are three key issues with respect to the information in a truth table (Ragin, 
Strand, and Rubinson 2008; Greckhamer 2011).  Firstly, each row identifies a configuration 
of considered conditions (organizational attributes here).  The identification of which cases 
(i.e. government departments) have strong membership with which configuration is 
determined by assigning 1 to membership scores  0.5, and 0 to those < 0.5 (hence each case 
can only have strong membership with one configuration).  In this analysis, the presence of 
five organizational attributes means there are 25 = 32 logical configurations (e.g. all logically 
possible configurations of the presence or absence of the five considered organizational 
attributes).  However, Tables 2 and 3 display only the nine logical configurations for which 
an association with at least one actual case is observed. Those configurations not included in 
the truth tables are logically possible, but empirically absent (Cooper and Glaesser 2011).  
Secondly, the interpretation of which configurations are particularly associated with 
High-capability (1s in High-capability column in Table 2) and Low-capability (1s in Low-
capability column in Table 3), is based on consideration of the values in the respective raw 
                                                 
2
 The outcome ‘High-capability’ is given by the capability membership score (see Figure A2).  ‘Low-capability’ 
is calculated by considering one minus the capability membership score values.   
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consistency columns.  Consistency scores are explained in full in the results section and are, 
in effect, a measure of the theoretical importance of a given configuration (Ragin 2006; 
Young and Park 2013).  The values in the raw consistency column measure how strong the 
relationship is between each causal combination and the outcome.  This is computed for each 
configuration from the membership score data, by dividing the sum of consistent membership 
in the configuration by the sum of membership in the outcome (see Ragin, Strand, and 
Rubinson 2008).  The choice of a consistency threshold for the raw consistency measure 
influences the strength of the evidence used in the subsequent analysis (Ragin 2006).  The 
chosen threshold value of 0.85 means that configurations with lower raw consistency values 
are not included in the minimization process.  In our analysis, a threshold of lower than 0.831 
would have resulted in identification of two cases as displaying both High and Low 
capability. A threshold value above 0.868 would have resulted in cases identified as having 
‘urgent development areas’ in the capability review not being identified as Low capability.  
Thus, qualitative assessment suggested the adoption of 0.85, addressing Schneider and 
Wagemann’s (2010) assertion that researchers must explicitly justify consistency thresholds, 
rather than referring to alleged conventions. Finally, the inclusion or exclusion of the logical 
remainders (possible configurations not actually observed) in set-theoretic analyses is an 
important consideration.   There are three strategies for dealing with remainders, leading to 
different solution formulas.  Importantly, all formulas are logically true because they do not 
contradict the available empirical information contained in the truth table.  Rihoux and Ragin 
(2009, 181) define the complex solution as a 'minimal formula derived without the aid of any 
logical remainders' – i.e. only utilising the available empirical data.  The parsimonious 
solution is a ‘minimal formula derived with the aid of logical remainders, without evaluation’ 
of their plausiblity (ibid 183) and with atheoretical allocation, in pursuit of the simplest 
solution (Cooper and Glaesser 2011).  Thus, this approach may yield fewer or more succinct 
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causal configurations.  Last, the intermediate solution is a ‘minimal formula derived with the 
aid of only those logical remainders consistent with the researcher’s theoretical and 
substantive knowledge’ (ibid 182).  
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, we present and analyse both the complex 
and parsimonious solutions, as advocated by Wagemann and Schneider (2010).  However, we 
do note that it has recently been argued that, except where a very strong body of existing 
theory can support the inclusion of logical remainders, it might be safer to privilege complex 
solutions (Cooper and Glaesser 2011).   
 
RESULTS 
In this section we present an overview of the output of our fsQCA analysis, conducted using 
fs/QCA Version 2.5, due to its capacity for conducting necessity analyses (see Ragin and 
Davey 2014).  Later we detail the specific necessity and sufficiency findings for the High-
capability and Low-capability outcomes respectively, namely analysing if a condition must 
be present for capability to occur (analysis of necessity), or if a given condition or 
combination of conditions can produce this result (analysis of sufficiency).  Necessity 
analysis was conducted prior to sufficiency analysis, to avoid inappropriately declaring 
conditions as necessary.  To begin, Table 4 presents the ‘sufficiency analyses’ used to 
interpret the complex and parsimonious fsQCA solutions in regard to High-capability and 
Low-capability outcomes.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Utilizing an amended version of the notation system from Ragin and Fiss (2008), each 
of the five columns shown in the top part of Table 4 represents an alternative causal 
combination of conditions linked to the respective outcome (Ragin 2008b).  Specifically, H1 
and H2 are the sufficient combinations associated with the High-capability outcome, while 
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L1, L2 and L3 are the sufficient combinations associated with the Low-capability outcome.  
Within these combinations, full circles ( ) indicate the presence of a condition, while barred 
circles ( ) indicate a condition’s absence.  Further, core and peripheral conditions are 
distinguished by symbols’ size: larger circles indicate core conditions that are part of both 
parsimonious and complex solutions (Ragin and Fiss 2008 discuss peripheral conditions as 
part of the intermediate solution, not considered here).  Smaller circles indicate peripheral 
conditions that only occur in complex solutions.  
The middle part of Table 4 details the consistency and coverage values for the 
complex solutions (e.g. those incorporating core and peripheral conditions, indicated by large 
and small circles respectively).  Consistency and coverage are two key parameters for 
assessing the fit of the fsQCA results to the underlying data (Ragin 2006).  In particular, they 
allow consideration of the gradations of association with an outcome (not feasible under 
crisp-set QCA).  As previously described, and following Greckhamer (2011), consistency 
measures the degree to which cases sharing a given configuration of conditions (the solution) 
are associated with an outcome.  Coverage scores assess the degree to which a configuration 
accounts for instances of an outcome, providing an indicator of the empirical importance of a 
causal configuration (Young and Park 2013).  Raw coverage measures the coverage of a 
configuration over cases, allowing for overlap with other possible combinations.  Unique 
coverage refers to coverage of cases uniquely due to a particular combination.  Solution 
consistency describes the extent of instances of the outcome collectively explained by all the 
configurations in a solution (complex or parsimonious).  Lastly, solution coverage refers to 
the combined coverage of all the configurations associated with an outcome (see also Ragin, 
Strand, and Rubinson 2008). 
For completeness, the bottom part of the table offers similar information based on the 
respective parsimonious solutions (e.g. incorporating only core conditions, indicated by large 
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circles).  Next, the identified combinations of causal conditions associated with High-
capability and Low-capability government departments are explored.  
 
Combinations of causal conditions for high- and low-capability 
Fiss (2011) argues that it is important to distinguish between the core and peripheral 
combinations of causal conditions in a set-theoretic analysis, especially those pertaining to 
the derivation of organizational configurations.  According to him, core causal conditions are 
those “for which the evidence indicates a strong causal relationship with the outcome of 
interest” (Fiss 2011, 398).  By contrast, peripheral causal conditions are those for which the 
causal relationship is weaker.  This distinction has strong applicability to the issue of 
organizational capability, since one might anticipate that certain attributes are likely to have 
much greater theoretical and empirical weight in shaping organizational behaviour and 
outcomes.  Indeed, the organization studies and strategic management literatures are replete 
with discussions about, and research into, what constitutes a core and a peripheral 
organizational attribute (see, for example, Hannan and Freeman 1984; Kelly and Amburgey 
1991).  In the following discussion, we draw upon the notion of core and peripheral 
combinations of conditions to explore the results of our necessity3 and sufficiency analyses in 
more detail. 
 
High-capability 
In response to our research question, necessity analysis suggests that an absence of personnel 
instability is nearly always required (0.959) for high-capability to occur.  This is the only 
organizational attribute with a consistency value above 0.9, as per Greckhamer (2011) and 
Young and Park (2013).  The sufficiency analysis presented in Table 4 indicates that there are 
                                                 
3
 Full details of the necessity analyses undertaken are available in the Appendix, in Table A2. 
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two core conditions associated with the parsimonious solution for high capability, namely an 
absence of personnel instability and an absence of structural complexity.  In fact, these two 
conditions are present in both the causal combinations making up the complex solutions 
derived by our analysis (H1 and H2).   
Kahn et al. (1964, 75) argue that as complexity increases, so “more levels of 
supervision are introduced to maintain coordination and control; and more people become 
involved in organizational planning”.  This, in turn, implies that fewer resources are being 
deployed to ensure that an organization is maximising the benefits from its distinctive 
competencies.  By contrast, simple structures may be especially effective in ensuring that 
organizations are able to exploit existing competencies (March 1991).  In addition to the 
challenges posed by complexity, personnel instability seems to represent a threat to the 
capability of central government departments.  Previous research has suggested that 
personnel stability is critical to organizational performance in the public sector, and to the 
sustained pursuit of the complex cross-cutting goals that are now the staple fare of public 
management (Milward and Provan 2000; O’Toole and Meier 2003).  Hence, the findings 
presented in Table 4 indicate that analysts may be right to be concerned about the potential 
effects of a “human resource crisis” within public organizations (Light 2006).  
In terms of peripheral conditions associated with High capability, Table 4 suggests 
that in H1 (consistency 0.972, raw coverage 0.404) the core conditions of structural 
simplicity and a stable core workforce are complemented by large size and a low number of 
temporary employees.  Thus, big departments seem likely to have higher capability if they are 
less reliant on the kind of transactional contracts typical of temporary employment.  The four 
departments which uniquely exhibit this complex configuration of conditions are the 
Chancellor’s departments; the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice, and the 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). Personnel stability may be especially important to 
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these organizations, due to the policy-specific expertise on which they rely. The Chancellor’s 
Departments and the Ministry of Justice deal with macro-economic policy and the British 
legal system, while the Ministry of Defence draws upon scientific and technical advice 
relating to military hardware and resources in particular. At the same time, the DWP provides 
the technical and administrative support required to manage the UK’s often complex social 
security system.  For similar reasons, temporary staff may have much less of a role in these 
departments, and the need for more complicated lines of authority may be less important as  a 
larger number of civil servants are employed at higher grades than in smaller less specialised 
departments.    
For H2 (consistency 0.942, raw coverage 0.177), the core conditions are 
complemented by small size, and a high level of agencification and temporary employment.  
Hence, smaller departments appear more likely to have high capability if there is a higher 
degree of personnel flexibility and sub-unit autonomy – their small scale may necessitate 
judicious engagement with additional human resources.  The one department uniquely 
exhibiting this complex configuration is Transport, which manages a range of agencies 
responsible for rail, road, air and water transportation, and the regulation of transport safety. 
The Department of Transport, like the other high-capability departments, is extremely 
dependent upon policy-specific expertise. However, the disaggregation of the department into 
agencies means that that expertise is more often drawn from sources outside government than 
is the case for the larger and more prestigious Chancellor’s Departments, Ministry of Defence 
and Justice and DWP, and so the role of temporary employees likewise may be more salient 
to the management of transport policy.   
The complex solutions incorporating the peripheral conditions highlight that fsQCA is 
able to identify equifinality in the relationships between organizational attributes and 
capability.  Or, put differently, the solutions highlight that as configurational approaches to 
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contingency theory suggest, organizations can ‘reach the same final state, from different 
initial conditions and by a variety of different paths’ (Katz and Kahn 1978, 30).  It is 
especially interesting to note the asymmetric roles that size and temporary employment play 
in determining high capability.  The impact of being big or small in size on high capability 
therefore appears to be contingent on other organizational attributes.  Likewise, in the right 
circumstances, temporary staff may be an aid rather than a hindrance to improving 
organizational capability.  This has long been recognised – with effective organizations 
analysing which employee groups to internalise, and creating psychological contracts 
premised on synergistic HR practices, appropriately applied by line managers (McDermott et 
al. 2013).    
  
Low-capability 
In response to our research question, necessity analysis did not identify any necessary 
organizational attributes (above the 0.9 threshold detailed previously) for Low-capability to 
occur.  Nevertheless, the results presented in Table 4 highlight that the presence of three core 
conditions is associated with low capability: structural complexity; agencification; and 
personnel instability, spread over the different causal combinations of conditions identified in 
L1, L2 and L3.  As noted above, the findings for complexity and instability accord with 
previous research on the effectiveness of public organizations (c.f. Kahn et al. 1964, O’Toole 
and Meier 2003).  Our analysis of the determinants of low capability has, however, identified 
another core condition shaping organizational capability in the public sector: the degree of 
agencification.  Departments with more agencies are tasked with managing sub-units with an 
especially high degree of autonomy over managerial and policy decisions, which, in turn, can 
create additional coordination problems for departmental leaders.  In fact, the UK and several 
other countries have introduced new structures to better facilitate the coordination of central 
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government agencies, including, in some circumstances, their re-integration with parent 
departments (see James and Van Thiel 2010).  Low levels of agencification was not a core 
condition associated with high capability, suggesting that the problems surrounding the 
coordination of agencies are more consequential than the benefits gained from having fewer 
autonomous sub-units.  
Regarding the peripheral conditions associated with low capability, Table 4 illustrates 
that for L1 (consistency 0.945, raw coverage 0.224), small size, low structural complexity, 
agencification and a low level of temporary employment complement the core condition of 
personnel instability.  Some of the major legal and border control functions of the Home 
Office, which is the single department associated with this configuration, were taken away 
from the department or disaggregated during the 2000s. At the same time, the Home Office 
appears not have benefited from the low complexity and low levels of temporary employment 
that seemed to be important for larger departments. Although it was no longer so dependent 
upon expert knowledge of the legal system, the department retained responsibility for some 
of the most challenging and politically contentious issues in UK domestic policy, such as 
policing and counter-terrorism activities. In fact, each of the capability reviews carried out in 
the late 2000’s consistently urged the Home Office to combine stronger corporate 
management along with a more flexible approach to staffing 
(http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/improving/capability/reports).   
 In the case of L2 (consistency 0.926, raw coverage 0.256), small size, structural 
complexity and low agencification combine with the core condition of personnel instability 
and a further peripheral one of few temporary staff.  This combination is uniquely associated 
with the Cabinet Office, which supports the Prime Minister, cabinet committees and 
coordinates the civil service as a whole. This department is the only one within UK central 
government that has an almost exclusively administrative function, with little responsibility 
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for either policy formulation or implementation. As such, policy-specific expertise rarely lies 
within the Cabinet Office, which is in essence composed of a cadre of generalist bureaucrats. 
Where such expertise is required, it is typically brought in on an ad-hoc informal basis rather 
than through the staffing system; all of which appeared to be making it difficult for the 
department to develop the characteristics of a capable organization at the time of the 
capability review. 
For L3 (consistency 0.879, raw coverage 0.406), small size and, somewhat 
surprisingly (perhaps related to the lowest consistency value across L1, L2 and L3) an 
absence of personnel instability combine with the core conditions of structural complexity 
and agencification.  The two core conditions draw attention to the challenges of coordination 
issues within structurally complex departments, and across agencies. There are five 
departments associated with this complex solution: Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform; Communities and Local Government; Food and Rural Affairs; Health; and 
Innovation, Universities and Skills.  Each of these departments manages a diverse portfolio of 
domestic regulatory and distributive public services, and so is not as dependent upon policy-
specific expertise as those departments that have been identified as high capability 
organizations. Nevertheless, although these ‘low-capability’ departments are more likely to 
be staffed with generalist bureaucrats, those people don’t seem to be circulating throughout 
the civil service. It is conceivable that the low level of personnel instability here reflects the 
comparatively low status of these departments in comparison with other bigger and more 
prestigious ones where demand for expertise may be greater, something that would be 
interesting to explore in more depth in subsequent research.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we examined the configurations of organizational attributes associated with 
high and low organizational capability in a little studied set of public organizations: UK 
central government departments.  In doing so, we respond to O’Toole and Meier’s (2015) call 
for empirical studies of public management in new and less familiar contexts, offering one of 
the first analyses of organizational capability in the public sector and developing a set of 
findings that illustrate the causal asymmetry between high and low capability. The results of 
our analyses suggest that there may be a single core organizational configuration associated 
with high capability in central government departments: low structural complexity and 
personnel stability.  By contrast, two core configurations appear to be associated with low 
capability, one that is exclusively determined by personnel instability and another which is 
determined by structural complexity and agencification.  Thus, our results imply that while 
there may be one main path to strengthening government capability, there could be several 
routes to reducing it.  At the same time though, our findings for high and low capability 
complement each other, reinforcing the message that structural complexity and personnel 
instability are likely to be critical influences on organizational capability in the public sector.  
This study and these findings give rise to several important implications. 
From a research perspective, integrating resource-based theory with other 
perspectives can help shed light on organizational functioning (Barney et al. 2011).  In 
offering a rare synthesis of the insights of resource-based and contingency theories, we have 
sought to illustrate that both theoretical perspectives have considerable relevance to public 
administration research.  Using fsQCA to identify structural configurations associated with 
high- and low-capability UK central government departments, we aimed to demonstrate the 
value of a set-theoretic approach to the study of public sector organizations.  In addition to 
furnishing a valuable approach to studying a small-n organization population, fsQCA has 
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enabled us to provide a nuanced appreciation of the nature of organizational capability – 
taking account of combinations of organizational attributes (c.f. Mintzberg 1993) - that 
wouldn’t be possible using conventional analytical approaches.  Fiss (2011) emphasises that 
by allowing causal asymmetry, set-theoretic analyses offers the potential for a much enriched 
theoretical comprehension of the nature of organizational configurations.  At the same time, 
causal asymmetry can underpin the development of better-targeted practical 
recommendations for senior managers making strategic choices about organizational 
improvements (ibid.). 
In terms of the practical implications of our study, our results suggest that public 
organizations should pay particular attention to retaining staff.  Or put differently, that 
organizational leaders should seek to ensure that staff feel valued and do not want to leave. 
That staff should feel valued and that personnel turnover hurts organizational development 
are not new insights to public administration research (see Moynihan and Pandey 2008), 
though we believe that they are observations worth repeating, particularly when discovered in 
an interesting and distinctive context, such as the UK civil service, for which little systematic 
research evidence is available.  These findings follow a range of authors within the resource-
based theory literature, who suggest that an organization’s intellectual knowledge and social 
capital and networks (linked to personnel stability) are rare and difficult to imitate – making 
them a likely source of sustained competitive advantage and organizational capability in the 
human capital intensive public sector context (Bryson, Ackermann, and Eden 2007; Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal 1998). The application of high-commitment human resource management 
practices and systems is one way in which staff retention in public organizations might be 
improved (Cho and Lewis 2012).  At a minimum, organizations should ensure congruence 
between the signals sent by their HR systems and their line managers’ leadership styles, to 
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ensure employees’ have clear expectations and that their psychological contracts are upheld 
(McDermott et al. 2013).   
The simplification of organizational structures by removing or reducing layers of 
management would seem to be another path towards high capability.  Although there is a 
sparse literature examining the nature of delayering in the public sector (e.g. Thomas and 
Dunkerley 1999), there is precious little evidence on the relationship between internal 
structural complexity and capability in either public (or private) organizations.  Our analysis 
suggests that by ensuring that lines of authority are clear and simple and by avoiding the 
proliferation of managerial ranks, public organizations are more likely to function effectively.  
Likewise, we provide valuable new evidence supporting the trend towards reverse 
agencification in the public sector as one that could have benefits for organizational 
functioning.  Whatever the supposed virtues of the devolution of responsibilities to semi-
autonomous organizational units, the management of public organizations would appear to be 
more effective in their absence, especially in the professional bureaucracies within central 
governments.   
Despite the strengths of the results we present here, the findings nevertheless raise 
many questions that are worthy of further research.  First, our analysis has examined a 
particular group of public organizations during a specific time period.  It would therefore be 
important to identify whether the configurations we observe are present in other time periods 
and in other organizational settings.  In particular, our findings are premised on eighteen 
cases, which may have inhibited the minimization that emerged from the QCA, due to the 
relatively high degree of limited diversity. Analyses drawing upon a larger set of public 
agencies, in particular, could utilise Wilson’s (1989) typology of government organizations to 
explore whether organizational type matters for configurations of capability.  Second, 
although the aggregated index of organizational capability we use enables us to capture the 
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multi-dimensional nature of public management in a single measure, it would be interesting 
to explore the potential for configurations of capability to vary across the sub-dimensions of 
capability in the future.  Finally, we have drawn upon fsQCA to investigate two focal 
outcomes – High-capability and Low-capability.  One of the many advantages of fuzzy over 
crisp set-theoretic analyses is that it can accommodate gradations in the focal outcome 
attribute.  Subsequent work could therefore follow Greckhamer’s (2011) example, and 
investigate multiple gradations of capability from very low, low, quite low and neither low 
nor high right through to very high.  This would allow the full range of causal asymmetry 
across possible configurations to be explored in the greatest of detail.  
At the same time, it may be the case that organizational attributes other than those we 
consider in this analysis are equally discerning between high and low capability government 
departments. The public administration literature highlights the importance of the relationship 
between politicians and bureaucrats and organizational reputation within central government 
agencies (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, 1981; Carpenter, 2001), as well as the 
background of organizational leaders (Petrovsky, James and Boyne, 2015). Whilst attributes 
such as human and social capital, customer orientation and cognitive diversity are all 
identified as critical intangible resources in the strategic management literature (Newbert 
2007). Analyses that brought together measures of these attributes with those that are 
identified as core conditions in this analysis would cast valuable further light on the nature of 
organizational capability in the public sector. 
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Table 1. Membership scores for conditions (Size, Complex, Agency, Temps, Instability) 
and outcome (Capability) 
 
 Department Size Complex Agency Instability Temps Capability 
1 Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform                  
0.090 0.816 0.580 0.156 0.344 0.293 
2 Cabinet Office                                              0.085 0.892 0.066 0.551 0.913 0.293 
3 Chancellor's Departments                                    0.940 0.226 0.071 0.065 0.258 0.750 
4 Children, Schools and 
Families                               0.068 0.553 0.035 0.071 0.472 0.866 
5 CLG Communities                                             0.063 0.942 0.624 0.151 0.495 0.190 
6 Culture, Media and Sport                                    0.036 0.968 0.114 0.123 0.994 0.293 
7 Defence                                                     0.890 0.410 0.077 0.103 0.087 0.750 
8 Energy and Climate 
Change                                   0.035 0.588 0.035 0.364 0.032 0.583 
9 Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs                         0.131 0.708 0.796 0.464 0.555 0.190 
10 Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office                             0.069 0.967 0.039 0.033 0.082 0.583 
11 Health                                                      0.065 0.939 0.571 0.175 0.455 0.070 
12 Home Office                                                 0.444 0.389 0.952 1.000 0.131 0.014 
13 Innovation, Universities 
and Skills                          0.042 0.954 0.723 0.287 0.120 0.583 
14 International Development                                   0.042 0.569 0.035 0.194 0.198 0.985 
15 Justice                                                     0.901 0.010 0.969 0.347 0.206 0.750 
16 Law Officers' 
Departments                                   0.103 0.821 0.081 0.320 0.573 0.583 
17 Transport                                                   0.261 0.421 0.955 0.343 0.525 0.750 
18 Work and Pensions                                           0.970 0.086 0.932 0.140 0.117 0.750 
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Table 2. Truth table for logical configurations of High-capability  
 
Size 
 
Complex 
 
Agency 
 
Instability 
 
Temps Number 
High-
capability 
Raw 
Consistency Cases 
1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1.000 3, 7 
1 0 1 0 0 2 1 0.958 15, 18 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.942 17 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.829 2 
0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0.798 4, 8, 10, 14 
0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0.692 6, 16 
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.689 12 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.632 9 
0 1 1 0 0 4 0 0.603 1, 5, 11, 13 
 
 
Table 3. Truth table for logical configurations of Low-capability  
 
Size 
 
Complex 
 
Agency 
 
Instability 
 
Temps Number 
Low-
capability 
Raw 
Consistency Cases 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.945 12 
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.935 9 
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.926 2 
0 1 1 0 0 4 1 0.868 1, 5, 11, 13 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.831 17 
0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0.807 6, 16 
0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0.679 4, 8, 10, 14 
1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0.615 3, 7 
1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0.598 15, 18 
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Table 4. Sufficiency analyses results for capability outcomes (including complex and 
parsimonious solutions) 
 
 High-capability Low-Capability 
Conditions H1 H2 L1 L2 L3 
Size  
     
Complex 
     
Agency 
 
    
Instability 
     
Temps 
    
 
Complex (cases) 3, 7, 15, 
18 
17 12 2 1, 5, 9, 
11, 13 
Consistency 0.972 0.942 0.945 0.926 0.879 
Raw Coverage 0.404 0.177 0.224 0.256 0.406 
Unique Coverage 0.275 0.048 0.068 0.089 0.211 
Solution Consistency 0.952 0.885 
Solution Coverage 0.452 0.569 
Parsimonious (cases) 3, 7, 15, 17, 18 2, 12 1, 5, 9, 11, 
13 
Consistency 0.959 0.922 0.893 
Raw Coverage 0.593 0.516 0.478 
Unique Coverage 0.593 0.231 0.193 
Solution Consistency 0.959 0.890 
Solution Coverage 0.593 0.709 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1. Raw data matrix for Size, Complex, Agency, Temps and Instability, and 
Capability 
 
 Department Size Complex Agency Instability Temps Capability 
1 Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform                  
8560 7306.028 55.96 0.598 3.154 60 
2 Cabinet Office                                              8070 7418.514 92.32 1.370 11.896 60 
3 Chancellor's Departments                                    100120 6483.909 91.27 0.248 2.687 66 
4 Children, Schools and 
Families                               6120 7075.083 100.00 0.283 3.758 68 
5 CLG Communities                                             5440 7538.691 52.94 0.583 3.860 58 
6 Culture, Media and Sport                                    610 7651.169 85.25 0.500 21.312 60 
7 Defence                                                     82800 6874.167 90.24 0.429 1.220 66 
8 Energy and Climate 
Change                                   280 7100.592 100.00 1.000 0.000 64 
9 Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs                         12080 7196.607 38.74 1.148 4.636 58 
10 Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office                             6150 7649.071 98.70 0.000 1.138 64 
11 Health                                                      5710 7529.360 56.57 0.648 3.678 54 
12 Home Office                                                 25960 6834.451 11.83 9.303 1.733 48 
13 Innovation, Universities 
and Skills                          1850 7583.346 45.41 0.875 1.622 64 
14 International Development                                   1740 7086.801 100.00 0.692 2.299 74 
15 Justice                                                     85790 4998.018 4.28 0.975 2.355 66 
16 Law Officers' Departments      9810 7311.227 89.70 0.931 4.893 64 
17 Transport                                                   19160 6894.210 10.44 0.967 4.228 66 
18 Work and Pensions                                           119180 5976.281 17.86 0.552 1.586 66 
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Table A2. Full details of the necessity analyses undertaken 
Table A2 presents the full results of the two necessity analyses undertaken on High-capability 
and Low-capability (found using fsQCA v2.5) using consistency value threshold above 0.9 
(see Ragin (2009) and Cebotari and Vink (2013)). 
 
 High-Capability Low-Capability 
Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
size 0.442 0.784 0.286 0.477 
~size 0.705 0.512 0.871 0.595 
complex 0.641 0.529 0.871 0.675 
~complex 0.605 0.833 0.392 0.506 
agency 0.447 0.541 0.599 0.682 
~agency 0.738 0.662 0.598 0.504 
instability 0.352 0.668 0.516 0.922 
~instability 0.959 0.678 0.814 0.541 
temps 0.432 0.612 0.585 0.778 
~temps 0.843 0.684 0.708 0.540 
 
Based on using the consistency threshold value of 0.9, shown in bold here, only the absence 
of instability is considered a necessary condition in respect to High-capability. Due to space 
limitations, these full details are not included in the paper. 
 
See:  Cebotari, V. and Vink, M. P. (2013) A configurational analysis of ethnic protest in 
Europe, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 54(4) 298–324. 
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Figure A1. Probability density function (pdfSize(x)) graph of Size condition, with 
thresholds for full-nonmembership, cross-over point and full-membership 
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Figure A2. Plots of degrees of membership to conditions and outcome (Size, Complex, 
Agency, Temps and Instability, and Capability)a 
 
 
 
a For each attribute, the five values shown on its horizontal axis, are (left to right): Minimum attribute value, 
threshold for full non-membership, crossover point, threshold for full membership and maximum attribute 
value. 
 
 
